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Medicaid patients have difficulty accessing primary care providers, especially when compared to 
privately-insured patients, leading to inefficient utilization of emergency departments for primary 
care. This study aims to examine whether gaining health insurance improves access to appropriate 
sources of primary care. In particular, this study examines whether gaining Medicaid coverage 
through the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion program improves access to primary care 
by utilizing a difference-in-difference design to compare the changes in emergency department 
utilization between the treatment group (those who gain coverage from this policy) and the control 
group before and after the policy implementation. Visit-level emergency department data for the 
state of New York (2012-2014) is used to observe changes in emergency department utilization, 
specifically the number of primary care-natured visits, as a result of the policy implementation. 
This study finds that Medicaid Expansion lead to an increase in primary care-natured visits in 
emergency departments by newly-covered Medicaid patients as well as an increase in the 
probability that a visit was primary care-natured. These results suggest that despite improved 
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1. Introduction  
The United States spends more money than any other country (in total and per capita) on 
healthcare—about 17.6% of national GDP, and the trend is continuing upward (Askin & Moore, 
2019). Yet, we have some of the poorest health outcomes of the developed countries. The U.S. is 
ranked last in health outcomes and overall healthcare performance in a comparison of eleven 
developed countries (see Appendix A) (Schneider et al., 2017). Life expectancy is increasing at a 
slower rate than other countries, and the U.S. ranks poorly in infant and maternal mortality, 
preventative care, and chronic disease care (Askin & Moore, 2019; Schneider et al., 2017). 
Disparities within the United States in health status and health outcomes are seen across insurance 
status, race, income, gender, and location. Those in lower socioeconomic statuses suffer from 
poorer health status, which in turn increases the likelihood of diseases and chronic conditions.  
An argument heard frequently to explain these health disparities across individuals is the 
lack of access to care due to cost. The U.S. ranks last in a comparison of other developed countries 
for access to care due to cost-related issues (see Appendix A) (Schneider et al., 2017). The cost of 
healthcare is so prohibitively high that without health insurance coverage most individuals cannot 
afford to pay out-of-pocket for care. As of 2017, about 9% of the population was uninsured (Health 
Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, 2019). Healthcare coverage and access to care are 
buzzword topics often heard in political debates about healthcare, and there have been multiple 
movements to increase coverage. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 intended to provide coverage 
for more individuals through multiple efforts—introducing new regulations in the private 
insurance market, enforcing an individual mandate, and implementing Medicaid Expansion. 
Currently, Senator Bernie Sanders has proposed a Medicare For All plan which would provide 
universal coverage to all Americans. Despite the heated discussion, there is mixed empirical 
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support for the effect of coverage expansion on access to care, especially among the most 
vulnerable populations.  
The research question I seek to address in this paper is: does healthcare coverage actually 
improve access to appropriate sources of primary care? One extremely inefficient care delivery 
model, and what this paper will focus on, is receiving primary care through a local emergency 
department. Currently, emergency departments are overutilized in the United States. One reason 
is that due to a shortage of primary care physicians, some patients have difficulty getting primary 
care through traditional avenues (New Findings Confirm Predictions on Physician Shortage, 
2019). Further, emergency departments are bound under the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA) to treat all patients regardless of their ability to pay (Emergency Medical 
Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), 2012). As a result, some patients (especially uninsured and 
Medicaid patients) seek primary or non-urgent care in emergency departments. This is likely 
because these two groups have the greatest difficulty seeing a primary care provider (further 
discussed in background section).  
Utilizing the emergency department for all types of care, as opposed to just emergent care, 
is inefficient as different venues are designed to provide different levels of care (primary vs. 
emergency vs. specialty). Patients that are visiting the emergency department with primary care or 
non-urgent concerns are inefficiently utilizing the department. This is disadvantageous for the 
patients as well as the emergency departments. Patients are likely not receiving important aspects 
of healthcare, such as preventative care, and emergency departments may experience 
overcrowding, which in turn leads to increased wait times, diminished resources, poorer outcomes, 
higher costs and increased total spend (Morley et al., 2018).  
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Previous literature has studied emergency department utilization through many different 
lenses. This paper focuses on classifying the nature of visits (emergent or primary-care natured) 
and examining how a change in insurance status alone affects the nature and frequency of visits. 
There have been similar studies performed in the past, however none have examined the effects of 
the Medicaid Expansion policy by studying emergency department data.  
This paper intends to examine emergency department visit-level data before and after 
Medicaid Expansion in New York State to determine if gaining healthcare coverage through 
Expansion improves access to appropriate and efficient sources of care. Medicaid Expansion, 
which is discussed further in the background section, expanded the program from coverage of 
individuals with income at or below 100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) to include 
individuals with income at or below 138% of the FPL. This policy change allows me to examine 
the isolated effects of gaining Medicaid coverage, assuming there are not any major changes in 
individuals aside from their qualification status for Medicaid.  
In theory, if an individual was uninsured and utilized the emergency department for 
primary care and then gained coverage, that individual would begin to seek care from a primary 
care physician or an urgent care center. However, there are other factors at play in the healthcare 
system, such as physicians’ willingness to accept Medicaid patients, that may lead to other results, 
such as an increase in primary care-natured emergency department visits. As theory alone leaves 
the results unclear, empirical evidence is required to determine the impact of Medicaid Expansion. 
To this end, I exploit a difference-in-difference model to eliminate variation in time periods 
and payor status to capture the effect of gaining Medicaid coverage through Medicaid Expansion 
on primary care-natured emergency department visits. I compare the treatment group, those who 
gain Medicaid as a result of Expansion, to the control group, patients in similar low-income ZIP 
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codes of other payor status, to examine the effect. I utilize visit-level data from the Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Emergency Department Databases (SEDD) for the state of 
New York for the years 2012 through 2014. The findings indicate that patients who were 
previously uninsured and became covered as a result of Medicaid Expansion increase utilization 
of the emergency department for primary care-natured reasons, meaning the policy, while 
increasing access to care overall, may not have been effective in increasing access to appropriate 
sources of primary care.  
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the Affordable Care Act, access to care, 
and emergency department utilization; Section 3 reviews the existing literature on Medicaid 
Expansion and emergency department visits; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents the 




2.1 Affordable Care Act 
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law by President 
Obama and implemented in 2014 with the goal of helping the uninsured population and providing 
coverage for more Americans. This was the largest healthcare transformation in the United States 
since the founding of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. The uninsured population decreased by 
8,516,600 lives (Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, 2019). Three provisions of 
the Act focused on coverage. 
The first was implementing new regulations on the private insurance market. The biggest 
changes were the guarantee of insurance regardless of pre-existing conditions, a ban on medical 
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underwriting, and the elimination of annual or lifetime benefit limits. This made it easier for 
individuals to get private insurance. 
The second was the individual mandate. This mandated citizens to obtain insurance, subject 
to exceptions, or face a tax penalty. Research indicates that there was little effect in increased 
coverage associated with the mandate (Frean et al., 2017). Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled 
in 2017 that the mandate was unconstitutional, and it was repealed January 1, 2019 (Kamal et al., 
2018). 
The third, and what this paper focuses on, was Medicaid Expansion. This policy expanded 
the Medicaid program to cover all adults with income at or below 138% of the federal poverty 
level. Medicaid is a federally- and state-funded program that is administered by the state. It was 
intended to provide coverage for the poor and medically needy or disabled. Previously, it provided 
coverage for individuals at or below 100% of the federal poverty level, pregnant women and 
children, and individuals with disabilities. It excluded a large group of low-income adults who 
were not below the federal poverty level. This population was too poor to afford private insurance 
or did not receive it through an employer but was not poor enough to receive coverage through the 
government program. The expansion of Medicaid was intended to provide coverage for this group 
of excluded people.  
A Supreme Court ruling in 2012 made expansion voluntary by state. Twenty-six states 
(including New York) and the District of Columbia expanded Medicaid; since then eleven more 
states have expanded (Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, 2020). Some states that have 
not expanded claim that Medicaid is such an ineffective program that it is actually not beneficial 
for more individuals to enroll in it. For states that initially opted to participate in Medicaid 
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Expansion, enrollment began October 1, 2013, and coverage began January 1, 2014. By November 
2014, nearly 25% of uninsured Americans had acquired healthcare coverage (Tolbert et al., 2019). 
As most Americans get health insurance either through their employer or a government 
program, changes in insurance status are often a result of employment changes. These might 
include being laid off from or hired to a company that offers employer-sponsored health insurance, 
or changes in income level which may qualify or disqualify an individual from a government 
program. These changes may be associated with or indicative of changes in health status. Using 
Medicaid Expansion as a natural experiment allows for changes in insurance status to be studied 
separately from other changes that may affect health status, as qualification status now changes 
without changes in income.  
2.2 Access to Primary Care 
Many patients in the United States have difficulty seeing a primary care physician. One 
reason for this is the shortage of primary care physicians in the U.S. It is projected the shortage is 
expected to increase to 55,000 primary care physicians by 2032 (New Findings Confirm 
Predictions on Physician Shortage, 2019). Unlike specialists who see patients irregularly, primary 
care physicians typically see patients on a routine basis with scheduled appointments. This creates 
a finite construct which limits the number of patients a primary care physician can see in a year. 
With that consideration, patients of all payor statuses have some difficulty seeing a primary care 
physician, mostly reflected in long wait times for appointments. 
However, it is even more difficult for Medicaid patients. Many primary care physicians do 
not accept Medicaid patients or accept only a limited number. Medicaid reimburses at the lowest 
rate, followed by Medicare, while private payors reimburse at the highest rates. As a result, 
physicians will often mainly accept privately-insured patients. Some independent physician 
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practices cannot rely solely on government payors and need to find a balance of private and 
government payors to survive financially. A study examining determinants of physicians’ 
acceptance of new Medicaid patients found that physicians are less likely to accept patients if the 
physicians currently have no Medicaid patients, have ownership in the practice, work in a small 
practice, have a low relative geographic reimbursement, or are a primary care physician (Bradbury, 
2015).  
2.3 Emergency Department Utilization 
As previously mentioned, emergency departments are overutilized. This is often due to the 
difficulty or inability to seek care elsewhere, when appropriate. However, it is not only uninsured 
patients showing up frequently in emergency departments. Medicaid patients have long been 
shown to overutilize emergency departments. As of 2016, 38% of patients visiting the emergency 
department are Medicaid patients, while only 21% of the population are covered by Medicaid 
(Center for Disease Control, 2016). They consistently make up the largest proportion of admissions 
into emergency departments. If we assume that medical emergencies are random, then we would 
expect to see the same proportion of payor status in the emergency department as in the total 
population. 
Many problems result from the overcrowding of emergency departments. Patients 
experience delays in care, increased exposure to errors, increased lengths of stay, poorer outcomes, 
and increased mortality. There are issues on the provider side as well. Emergency department staff 
experience increased stress, increased exposure to violence, and non-adherence to best practice 
guidelines. The hospital experiences bottleneck problems both at the emergency department-
admission and transfer-to-inpatient points mostly due to increased lengths of stay (Morley et al., 
2018).  
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The two biggest obstacles to care for patients are cost and time. Patients experience a 
restriction due to cost that causes some to go without treatment—only 55-70% of Americans 
receive the care they need (Askin & Moore, 2019). Additionally, when patients have trouble 
seeking the care they need, they might go to a systematically inefficient site of care. Emergency 
departments are seen as a catch-all for symptoms and are required to provide care regardless of 
payor status. According to the 2016 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, the 
majority of patients (70.6% of visits) were seen by a physician in the emergency department within 
an hour (Center for Disease Control, 2016). This is much faster than the weeks or months it might 
take to schedule an appointment with a primary care provider. This survey also recorded triage 
status, which included Immediate, Emergent, Urgent, Semi-Urgent, and Non-Urgent. The largest 
portion of Non-Urgent visits was made by uninsured patients, followed closely by Medicaid 
patients. The two lowest urgency statuses (Semi-Urgent and Non-Urgent) account for 37.2% of 
visits for the uninsured and 33.6% of visits for Medicaid patients. This percentage is higher for 
both groups when compared to the privately-insured group (27.1%). However, it is possible that 
patients are assigned a certain urgency status or diagnosis code because the provider is taking the 
patient’s payor status into account, such as assigning a lower payor status patient a lower urgency 
status. As a result, the diagnosis may be endogenous to the payor status of the patient. While this 
is a concern, the data still provides motivation for this research question by demonstrating that 
uninsured and Medicaid patients are inefficiently utilizing the emergency departments.  
 
3. Literature Review 
The majority of the existing literature on Medicaid Expansion and emergency department 
utilization has been published in medical journals such as the Journal of the American Medical 
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Association (JAMA), Health Affairs, and other medical specialty journals. There is a more limited 
body of research found in economic journals. Studies published in medical journals tend to focus 
more on utilization and health outcomes while economic journals tend to focus on changes in 
healthcare coverage. This study will contribute to the existing literature by examining access to 
primary care through emergency department utilization using Medicaid Expansion as a natural 
experiment.  
The existing literature focuses on the two waves of Medicaid expansion in the United 
States. The first was the gradual expansion of parental Medicaid eligibility in the late 1990’s, and 
the more recent expansion in 2014 was a result of the Affordable Care Act. Studies on these 
policies have focused on the effects on enrollment or specific treatment utilization. Hamersma & 
Kim (2013) found that expansion in the late 1990’s increased Medicaid participation, with no 
evidence of crowding out. This finding was supported by a more recent study that examined the 
effects of both private and public insurance provisions of the Affordable Care Act and found that 
60% of the increased total coverage was explained by increased Medicaid enrollment while the 
other 40% was explained by exchange premium subsidies. Interestingly, increases in coverage 
were seen in both the newly-eligible as well as previously-eligible populations in both expansion 
and non-expansion states, indicating Medicaid Expansion had some spillover effects (Frean et al., 
2017). Medicaid enrollment in expansion states has increased 34.4% since 2013 (MACPAC, 
2019). These findings indicate that these two large Medicaid policy changes, including the recent 
Medicaid Expansion, were successful in increasing the number of Americans with healthcare 
coverage.  
Other research has examined the utilization effects of Medicaid Expansion by studying 
specific treatments and care decisions. Overall, there is a positive association with Medicaid 
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Expansion and treatment utilization, meaning as patients gain coverage, they start to receive more 
healthcare. Wen et al. (2017) examined the utilization of the buprenorphine drug for opioid use 
disorder treatment and found that Medicaid Expansion was associated with a 70% increase in 
Medicaid-covered buprenorphine prescription. Another study found a significant increase in 
orthopedic procedures, which are typically elective, received by Medicaid patients after expansion 
(Williamson et al., 2019). Gordon et al. (2020) found an increase in the number of postpartum 
outpatient visits and improved stability of postpartum coverage in states that expanded Medicaid. 
These studies suggest that healthcare coverage improves access to specialty care. 
However, an increase in care received does not necessarily indicate equity in access to care 
across patients of different payor statuses. Studies have shown that providers make decisions about 
patients based on their payor status and financial incentives. Sirovich et al. (2008) found that 
physicians in high-spending regions saw patients more frequently and recommended more tests 
and interventions compared to physicians in low-spending regions. Similarly, Brekke et al. (2017) 
found that general practitioners in Norway increased their number of patient visits when there was 
an increase in the consultation fee. These findings indicate that physicians are more likely to see 
patients with better payor status and offer those patients more treatments, though arguably 
unnecessarily.   
As previously mentioned, some physicians may not accept a patient based solely on payor 
status (Bradbury, 2015). Other research has shown that physicians and providers make strategic 
discharge decisions based on payor status. Eliason et al. (2018) find evidence that long-term care 
hospitals strategically discharge Medicare patients in response to financial incentives (once they 
have crossed the threshold to receive the bulk payment), meaning those patients could be receiving 
too little or too much care than what is optimal. Similarly, Hackmann & Pohl (2018) find that 
 13 
nursing homes shorten the stay of Medicaid patients if needed to allow for more profitable out-of-
pocket payers. Overall, physicians do consider and respond to financial incentives, so Medicaid 
(as a low reimbursor) may be an impediment to patients receiving the appropriate healthcare.  
There is also a body of literature studying the effects of coverage on emergency department 
utilization, though none has examined the effects of Medicaid Expansion on primary care-natured 
visits. Hosseinichimeh et al. (2016) found that changes in healthcare coverage explain only a very 
small amount of variation in emergency department utilization. Further, this study predicted to see 
little change in utilization as a result of Medicaid Expansion. However, previous studies have 
found that changes in insurance status do significantly affect emergency department utilization 
patterns. Chen et al. (2015) found that a lack of insurance was associated with a higher probability 
of a primary care visit at an emergency department when compared to private insurance. Medicaid 
and Medicare were also associated with a higher probability of a primary care visit at an emergency 
department when compared to private insurance. An interesting finding, however, is that the 
marginal impact of changing payor status from uninsured to public insurance is associated with an 
increased probability of an emergency department visit being for a primary care reason. Taubman 
et al. (2014) supported these results by finding that gaining Medicaid resulted in an increased 
number of all types of emergency department visits, both primary care-natured and emergent. 
However, as previously mentioned, changes in payor status are often associated with other changes 
in health status predictors (e.g., employment status or income level). These studies acknowledge 
that their findings cannot predict what the effects of the Medicaid Expansion policy will be. A 
study that did examine Medicaid Expansion found that the total number of emergency department 
visits did not significantly increase but the payor mix changed. Medicaid visits increased 27.1%, 
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while uninsured visits decreased 31.4% (Pines et al., 2016). This study did not examine primary 
care visits. 
My study contributes to the existing literature by examining access to primary care through 
emergency department utilization. It adds to both bodies of Medicaid Expansion literature as well 
as emergency department utilization literature. Focusing on Medicaid Expansion as a policy 
change to highlight how access to primary care changes with insurance coverage, this study adds 
to previous studies by contributing findings from a more recent policy. 
 
4. Data 
This paper uses the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Emergency 
Department Databases (SEDD) for the state of New York from 2012 to 2014. Each year of data 
covers the universe of emergency department visits across all hospitals in New York state. Each 
observation is an emergency department visit with information on the timing of the visit (by 
month), the patient (age, gender, race, location), the diagnoses, the treatment, the cost, and outcome 
of the visit. The patients are identified by a randomly-assigned, unique patient identification 
number, allowing me to track them over time.  
The data set is constructed by selecting a random 5% sample of the patients who had any 
visit in 2012 and tracking them over the three years. As a result, there are fewer patients and visits 
in the data set for 2013 and 2014. Any observations with missing key identifiable information 
(unique patient ID, payor status, age, gender, race, etc.) are dropped from the data set. Patients 
over 65 are excluded as they are eligible for Medicare. Patients living in a ZIP code with median 
household income in the 3rd or 4th national quartile are excluded as well. This variable is the best 
proxy for income in the data set, so the sample was limited by this variable to make the treatment 
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and control groups more similar. Table B1 in Appendix B displays the Federal Poverty Levels as 
well as 138% of the FPL (the new Medicaid eligibility cut off), and Table B2 displays the income 
ranges for the quartiles. Assuming the majority of households have at most six people, the 
eligibility cut off is within the 1st or 2nd quartile. If a patient does not show up in a certain month, 
it is assumed they did not visit any emergency department, however it is possible they moved. 
International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition (ICD-9) codes are used by all hospitals 
to classify diagnoses. The HCUP data set includes these diagnosis codes for each visit but does 
not classify the urgency of the visit. To do so, the NYU Emergency Department Visit Algorithm 
is utilized to categorize the visits. This algorithm is the most widely used tool for retrospectively 
assessing the probability of the urgency of an emergency department visit. This algorithm has been 
used in previous studies (Chen et al., 2015; Taubman et al., 2014) for classifying the nature of 
emergency department visits. Physicians reviewed 6,000 full emergency department records with 
data including initial complaint, symptoms, vital signs, medical history, age, gender, diagnoses, 
procedures performed, and resources used to determine the urgency probability of each diagnosis 
code. I use an updated version of the original algorithm which reduced the number of unclassified 
diagnoses (Johnston et al., 2017). The algorithm assigns a probability, based on the primary 
diagnosis code (ICD-9), that the visit is one of four urgency categories: 1) non-emergent, 2) 
emergent/primary care treatable, 3) emergent/ED care needed/preventable/avoidable, or 4) 
emergent/ED care needed/not preventable/avoidable. (Figure 1 displays the classification tree.) 
The probability can be distributed across the four categories, reflecting the possible variability of 
urgency within a diagnosis code. For example, streptococcal sore throat is 66% non-emergent, 
28% emergent/primary care treatable, and 6% emergent/ED care needed/preventable/avoidable. 
However, if the visit is classified mental health related, alcohol related, substance abuse related, 
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injury, or unclassified, it is not assigned an urgency probability by the algorithm and thus is 
dropped from the data set (Allen et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 1. NYU ED Algorithm Classification Tree  
Source: NYU ED Visit Algorithm 
The two lowest urgency categories (non-emergent and emergent/primary care treatable) 
are summed to obtain the probability that a visit is primary care-natured. If the summed probability 
is greater than 50%, the visit is classified primary care-natured (Gandhi & Sabik, 2014). Similarly, 
if the summed probability is less than 50%, the visit is classified emergent.  
The group of interest is patients who were previously uninsured and then covered by 
Medicaid after January 1, 2014. Two dummy variables are created to capture both the change from 
uninsured to Medicaid as well as the change in time period (explained further in the methods 
section). 
In the end, I have an unbalanced panel of 2,822,940 observations with 202,575 visits across 
206 hospitals by 78,415 patients, each of whom have been tracked over 36 months, with 24 months 
before the policy implementation and 12 months after. The effects of this policy are expected to 
be immediate, so any change should be detected in the one year post-expansion. I then create 
another data set of the monthly observations aggregated at the yearly level. Most individuals do 
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not visit the emergency department every month, so I run analysis on this data set as well for 
aggregated results. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for 2012-2014 patient characteristics including age, 
race, gender, payor status, patient location, and median household income for their ZIP code. 
Among the 78,415 patients in the data set, the majority were female, between the ages of 20 and 
39, and Black. The largest payor was Medicaid, followed by private insurance and then self-pay 
(uninsured). While the total number of patients decreased each year due to selection, the percent 
of Medicaid patients increased nearly 10% from 2012 to 2014. The percent of patients with private 
insurance or self-pay both decreased, meaning these groups utilized the emergency department 
less consistently, even before Medicaid Expansion. The majority of patients live in ZIP codes in 
the first quartile of median household income and in a large metropolitan area. The percent of 
patients who visit the emergency department multiple times within the same year increases from 
2012 to 2014. This is likely because of the data set construction. If an individual is showing up 
every year in the emergency room, they are likely to be “frequent flyers” and show up multiple 
times each year.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for admission characteristics including when patients 
were admitted, discharge status, length of stay, average number of diagnoses and procedure codes, 
average total charge, and average number of visits. About 74% of visits occurred on a weekday, 
which aligns with the number of weekdays in a week, meaning there does not appear to be a 
disproportionate number of visits on the weekend. About 43% of visits occurred during normal 
business hours (Monday through Friday, 8:00 am to 5:00 pm). For the large majority of visits, the 
patient did not stay overnight and was routinely discharged from the emergency department. About 
80% of the visits were primary care-natured, this is likely overstated due to observations dropped  
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Table 1. Patient Characteristics by Year  
 2012  2013  2014  
 N % N % N % 
Total Patients 69,446  26,719  23,628  
Sex       
Female 39,735 57.22 16,100 60.26 14,046 59.45 
Male 29,711 42.78 10,619 39.74 9,582 40.55 
Age group (Years)       
Under 20 21,768 31.35 7,561 28.30 5,960 25.22 
20 to 39 26,721 38.48 10,957 41.01 9,416 39.85 
40 to 65 20,957 30.18 8,201 30.69 8,252 34.92 
Race/Ethnicity       
White 21,282 30.65 7,467 27.95 6,757 28.60 
Black 20,314 29.25 9,142 34.22 8,237 34.86 
Hispanic 17,936 25.83 7,015 26.25 5,829 24.67 
Other 10,605 15.27 3,629 13.58 2,805 11.87 
Primary Payor       
Medicaid 31,914 45.96 14,403 53.91 12,882 54.52 
Private insurance 19,246 27.71 5,928 22.19 5,121 21.67 
Self-pay 13,212 19.02 3,888 14.55 3,215 13.61 
Medicare 2,818 4.06 1,631 6.10 1,662 7.03 
Other 2,192 3.16 840 3.14 734 3.11 
No charge 65 0.09 29 0.11 14 0.06 
Median Household Income National Quartile for Patient ZIP Code    
First Quartile 41,852 60.27 15,330 57.37 13,827 58.52 
Second Quartile 27,594 39.73 11,389 42.63 9,801 41.48 
Patient Location       
Large Metropolitan 50,138 72.20 19,291 72.20 17,738 75.07 
Small Metropolitan 9,705 13.97 3,746 14.02 2,951 12.49 
Micropolitan 7,084 10.20 2,784 10.42 2,191 9.27 
Other 2,519 3.63 898 3.36 748 3.17 
Chronic Conditions       
None 48,650 70.05 17,189 64.33 14,278 60.43 
One or more 20,796 29.95 9,530 35.67 9,350 39.57 
Revisit       
Yes 20,508 29.53 15,503 58.02 14,221 60.19 
No 48,938 70.47 11,216 41.98 9,407 39.81 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Patients over 65 were excluded from the data set. Other Race/Ethnicity includes Asian or Pacific Islander, Native 
American, and Other. Other primary payor includes Worker’s Compensation, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Title V, and other 
government programs. In 2012, the first quartile income range was $1-38,999, second quartile was $39,000-47,999. In 2013, 
the first quartile income range was $1-37,999, second quartile was $38,000-47,999. In 2014, the first quartile income range was 
$1-39,999, second quartile was $40,000-50,999. Large metropolitan areas include more than 1 million residents. Small 
metropolitan areas include less than 1 million residents. Micropolitan areas include urban clusters of 10,000 – 50,000 residents. 
Other is defined as not metropolitan or micropolitan. 
 
 19 
Table 2.  Admission Characteristics by Year 
 2012  2013  2014  
 N % N % N % 
Total Visits 108,091  50,830  43,654  
Admission Day of the Week       
Weekday 79,788 73.81 37,596 73.96 32,251 73.88 
Weekend 28,303 26.19 13,234 26.04 11,403 26.12 
Admission Hour       
Business Hours (8-5) 46,427 42.95 21759 42.81 18,699 42.83 
After Business Hours 61,664 57.05 29,071 57.19 24,955 57.17 
Disposition Status       
Routine 103,386 95.65 48,768 95.94 42,049 96.32 
Short-Term Hospital 1,037 0.96 389 0.77 237 0.54 
Transfer Other 152 0.14 105 0.21 218 0.50 
Home Health Care 1,020 0.94 269 0.53 21 0.05 
Against Medical Advice 2,424 2.24 1,276 2.51 1,103 2.53 
Died in Hospital 72 0.07 23 0.05 26 0.06 
Length of Stay (Days)       
0 99,274 91.84 45,617 89.74 38,884 89.07 
1 8,593 7.95 5,014 9.86 4,545 10.41 
2 187 0.17 173 0.34 183 0.42 
3 37 0.03 26 0.05 42 0.10 
Nature of Visit       
Emergent 20,138 18.63 9,945 19.57 8,763 20.07 
Primary Care-Natured 87,953 81.37 40,885 80.43 34,891 79.93 
 Avg SD Avg SD Avg SD 
Hospital ED Charges $1,434.29 $1,545.91 $1,586.14 $1,723.52 $1,775.16 $2,045.53 
Number of Diagnosis 
Codes 2.14 1.60 2.0 1.91 2.58 2.15 
Number of CPT Codes 5.58 5.90 5.50 5.75 6.20 6.63 
Probability of Primary 
Care Visit 0.73 0.28 0.72 0.29 0.71 0.29 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Transfer Other means transfer to Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF), Intermediate Care Facility (ICF), or Other. A 0-day 
length of stays means a same-day stay. The variable is limited to 0-3 days for outpatient data. Hospital ED Charges is measured 




as result of using the NYU ED Algorithm. Many of the observations that fell under mental health 
related, alcohol related, etc. were likely emergent. The average total charge per visit increases over 
the years, though the dollars have not been adjusted for inflation. The probability of a primary 
care-natured visit did not seem to significantly change across year. 
 
Table 3. Nature of Visit by Three Main Payor Type 
  2012  2013  2014  
  N % N % N % 
Medicaid       
 Emergent 9,645 17.60 5,584 19.22 4,918 19.46 
 Primary Care-Natured 45,171 82.40 23,470 80.78 20,349 80.54 
Private         
 Emergent 5,429 20.80 1,914 19.70 1,691 20.95 
 Primary Care-Natured 20,669 79.20 7,804 80.30 6,379 79.05 
Self-pay         
 Emergent 3,129 16.96 1,209 18.03 924 17.61 
 Primary Care-Natured 15,321 83.04 5,496 81.97 4,324 82.39 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
 
Table 3 displays the breakdown of the nature of the visit by payor type. Within and across payor 
types, the percent of primary care-natured visits are roughly the same. In 2012, Medicaid and 
uninsured patients had slightly more PCN visits than privately-insured patients.  
 Dropping observations in the construction of the data set caused certain aspects of the 
sample statistics to differ from the full 5% random sample. Sample statistics for the full 5% random 
sample are displayed in Tables B3 and B4. The notable differences in the two data sets have to do 
with payor status, emergency department revisits, and the nature of the visit. In the first year, the 
majority of patients were privately insured, however in the subsequent years the majority was 
Medicaid patients. This indicates that the population that continues to utilize the emergency 
department each year was largely Medicaid patients. The constructed data set also reports higher 
percentages of patients revisiting the emergency department within a year. Additionally, the 
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probability of a visit being primary care-natured and the percent of primary care-natured visits 
each year are higher in the constructed data set. This is likely due to the observations that were 
dropped (that were likely emergent) as a result of using the NYU ED Visit Algorithm leading to a 
higher percentage of primary care-natured visits. 
 Table 4 displays motivating evidence about changes in payor status. The treatment group 
(*) is the population that changed from uninsured to Medicaid. If they were previously covered by 
Medicaid and then covered by Other (includes private, Medicare, etc.), it is possible they started 
receiving coverage through an employer or a family member. If they were previously covered by 
Medicaid and then uninsured, it is possible their income increased enough to no longer qualify for 
Medicaid, but they are not covered by or cannot afford private insurance. The table demonstrates 
that there is a large population of patients who became covered by Medicaid after Medicaid 
Expansion (nearly 40% of previously uninsured). This percent was slightly larger than the percent 
of people who gained Medicaid from a previously uninsured status in 2013 (about 34%). The 
majority of patients kept the same payor status after Medicaid Expansion, however the change 
from uninsured to Medicaid was the largest change in the data set.  




























Total 2,675 11,146 6,097 19,918 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD 
Notes: Other includes Private, Medicare, Other, and No Charge. The percentage represents the percent of the before 
group that is now in the after group. Before represents the most recent payor status before Medicaid Expansion. 
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Figure 2 displays the number of visits (total and primary care-natured) by month for the 
year leading up to and after Medicaid Expansion (implemented January 1, 2014). There is a 
decrease in the total number of visits (due to selection as explained previously) and in the number 
of primary care-natured visits. The average number of visits was 4,236 per month for 2013 and 
3,638 per month in 2014. The average number of primary care-natured visits was 3,407 per month 
in 2013 and 2,908 per month in 2014. It appears that the proportion of primary care-natured visits 
of the total number of visits remains relatively constant. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Visits and Primary Care-Natured Visits per Month 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: The number of total visits measures the number of emergency department admissions. The number of primary 
care-natured visits measures the number of emergency department admissions that were classified primary care-
natured by the NYU ED Visit Algorithm. The figure displays visits for the year leading up to and the year after the 
implementation of Medicaid Expansion on January 1, 2014 (indicated by vertical line).  
 
Figure 3 displays the percent of visits (total and primary care-natured) made by Medicaid 
patients for the year leading up to and after Medicaid Expansion. In 2013, the average percent of 
visits by Medicaid patients was 57.06% and increased slightly to 57.29% in 2014. The average 
percent of primary care-natured (PCN) visits by Medicaid patients in 2013 was 57.39% and also 



















































two years, indicating that Medicaid patients are not disproportionately showing up for primary 
care-natured visits compared to emergent visits. However, there is a chance that Medicaid patients 
utilize the emergency department for primary care so frequently that the total number of visits by 
Medicaid patients is essentially the same as the number of PCN visits by Medicaid patients.  
 
Figure 3. Percent of Visits and Primary Care-Natured Visits by Medicaid Patients 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Medicaid patients are those who have Medicaid as their primary payor. The percent of visits was calculated 
both for the total number of ED visits as well as the number of primary care-natured visits. The figure displays visits 
for the year leading up to and the year after the implementation of Medicaid Expansion on January 1, 2014 (indicated 
by vertical line).  
 
Figure 4 displays the number of total visits and the number of primary care-natured visits by month 
by Medicaid patients. This figure looks similar to Figure 2, indicating the Medicaid population 
follows the same utilization trends as the total population. This figure also displays the differences 
in the number of total visits and the number of primary care-natured visits, supporting the 
interpretation of Figure 3, that Medicaid patients are not showing up disproportionately for primary 
care visits. The average number of visits by Medicaid patients was 2,421 per month in 2013 and 
2,106 per month in 2014. The average number of PCN visits by Medicaid patients was 1,956 per 
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Figure 4. Number of Visits and Primary Care-Natured Visits per Month by Medicaid Patients 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Medicaid patients are those who have Medicaid as their primary payor. The number of total visits measures the 
number of emergency department admissions. The number of primary care-natured visits measures the number of 
emergency department admissions that were classified primary care-natured by the NYU ED Visit Algorithm. The 
figure displays visits for the year leading up to and the year after the implementation of Medicaid Expansion on 
January 1, 2014 (indicated by vertical line).  
 
5. Empirical Model 
I use a difference-in-difference strategy to examine the change in primary care-natured 
visits between payor types before and after Medicaid Expansion and to determine causality. The 
first difference in the model is the time period: before and after Medicaid Expansion (After). The 
second difference is the change in payor status (GotMedicaid) which represents a change from 
uninsured to Medicaid. The differences control for any variation in utilization seen between 
patients of all payor types and time-related changes. This model allows for any unobserved time-
invariant characteristics in the data (e.g., health status or health habits) to be differenced out and 
any change in emergency department visits to be attributed to the policy change. The equation is 
as follows: 


















































Total Visits by Medicaid
Primary Care-Natured Visits by Medicaid
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!!" is the outcome variable of interest, the utilization of emergency departments. 
Specifically, I construct six different measures of utilization: the number of monthly visits by an 
individual, the probability of a visit being primary care-natured (PCN), the number of monthly 
PCN visits, the number of monthly PCN visits during business hours, the number of monthly PCN 
visits outside of business hours, and the number of monthly emergent visits. I also aggregate the 
data at the yearly level creating six new dependent variables: the number of yearly visits by an 
individual, the average probability of a visit being PCN, the number of yearly PCN visits, the 
number of yearly PCN visits during business hours, the number of yearly PCN visits outside of 
business hours, and the number of yearly emergent visits. In total, there are 12 different outcome 
variables. The number of visits, the number of PCN visits, and the probability of a visit being PCN 
are used for the main results. The number of PCN visits during and outside of business hours and 
the number of emergent visits are used for supplemental results. 
Afterit is an indicator variable where the value is equal to one if the patient visit occurs on 
or after January 1, 2014 and is equal to zero if the visits occurs before that date. GotMedicaidit is 
an indicator variable where the value is equal to one if the patient’s payor status changed from 
uninsured to Medicaid at any point in time and equal to zero for everything else. The interaction 
term is the combination of the two previous variables. This term captures the effect of gaining 
Medicaid as a result of the Medicaid Expansion policy. Xit is a vector of time-varying patient 
characteristic controls. ai is a vector of patient fixed effects. eit is the error term, clustered at the 
patient level. 
b1 captures the change in number of visits over time for all patients. b2 captures the change 
in number of visits for patients who gain Medicaid from a previously uninsured status. b3, the 
coefficient of primary interest, captures the differential change in number of visits for patients in 
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the treatment group relative to the control group. Again, the treatment group (those who gain 
Medicaid through Expansion) are compared to patients who look similar in terms of income (by 
limiting to low-income ZIP codes) as that is a proxy for insurance status and qualification status. 
If there is a decrease in the number of primary care-natured visits by patients that gain 
coverage, I can assume they are now seeking primary care elsewhere. If it remains the same, 
newly-covered patients have not changed their utilization decisions. If there is an increase in 
utilization, then there is some other factor influencing site-of-care decisions.  
I then corroborate the difference-in-difference results with a fixed effects model. This 
model allows me to assume that anything unobservable in the data stays unchanged over time 
within the same patient. With this assumption, any change in emergency department utilization 
patterns within the same patient is attributed to gaining Medicaid coverage. The fixed effects 
model is as follows: 
!!" =	## + #$(,-(.)/0120/)!" + #%5!" + 6! + 7!" . 
This model allows me to examine how the within-patient variation in visits is affected by gaining 
Medicaid. This model is also run with the same dependent variables as the previous model.  
 The GotMedicaidit indicator variable is defined the same way. Xit is a vector of time-
varying patient characteristic controls. ai captures the unobserved time-invariant patient effect. b1 
captures the change in number of visits within an individual who gains Medicaid from uninsured 
status.  
 As the GotMedicaidit variable is defined in such a way that it can change over time within 
the same patient before and after January 1, 2014, I can utilize a difference-in-difference model 
with patient fixed effects. The interaction term of the difference-in-difference model now captures 
the effects of gaining Medicaid coverage before and after the policy change within an individual.  
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 Of these different methods, the two difference-in-difference models (with and without 
fixed effects) are of primary interest to examine the effect of the Medicaid Expansion policy on 
primary care-natured emergency department visits. These models capture the effect of receiving 
coverage as a result of the policy (through a change in qualification status) rather than simply the 
effect of receiving Medicaid coverage. The two models offer different interpretations of the results 
in terms of measuring variation within the sample or within an individual. 
 
6. Results 
 An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is initially run to examine the basic effect of 
payor status on emergency department visits. This regression is run on the three monthly outcome 
variables (number of monthly visits, number of monthly primary care-natured (PCN) visits, and 
probability of a primary care-natured visit). Table 5 displays these results with private insurance 
as the reference payor status.1 Medicaid and Medicare patients have fewer monthly emergency 
department visits compared to privately-insured patients. Uninsured patients have more monthly 
visits than privately-insured patients, but the effect is insignificantly estimated. All three payor 
status groups have more monthly primary care-natured visits and a higher probability of a visit 
being primary care-natured than the privately-insured group. 
Table 6 displays the results from the same OLS regression but on the yearly aggregated 
data. Medicaid, Medicare, and uninsured patients have more yearly emergency department visits 
(both in total and primary care-natured) than privately-insured patients as well as a higher 
probability of a visit being primary care-natured. Examining the two regressions together, 
Medicaid and Medicare patients act similarly and visit the emergency department less within a 
 
1 Alternate regressions were run with self-pay (uninsured) as the reference group. See Appendix B for results.  
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Table 5. OLS Regression by Payor Status: Private Reference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Number of monthly visits Number of monthly PCN visits Probability of visit being PCN 
Medicaid -0.00534** 0.0225*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.00247) (0.00393) (0.00212) 
Medicare -0.0107* 0.0343*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.00592) (0.00903) (0.00415) 
Self-pay 0.00438 0.0381*** 0.0208*** 
 (0.00319) (0.00487) (0.00264) 
    
Age in years  0.000137** -0.000373*** -0.000533*** 
 (0.0000617) (0.000104) (0.0000576) 
Female -0.00548** 0.0422*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00369) (0.00190) 
Black 0.00581 0.00837 0.00543* 
 (0.00402) (0.00624) (0.00313) 
Hispanic 0.0133*** 0.0174*** 0.00145 
 (0.00413) (0.00638) (0.00322) 
Number of total visits 0.0488*** 0.0319*** -0.00275*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00144) (0.000456) 
Number of chronic conditions -0.00517*** -0.0786*** -0.0539*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00180) (0.000996) 
R-squared 0.161 0.071 0.067 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.07 0.058 0.724 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Payor status also includes Other and No charge groups. 
These are included in the regression but not reported. The baseline group for race is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as 
controls but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are 
reported in parentheses.  
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Table 6. OLS Regression by Payor Status: Private Reference (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN visits Probability of visit being PCN 
Medicaid 0.0423*** 0.0704*** 0.0211*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00570) (0.00205) 
Medicare 0.0410*** 0.0658*** 0.0261*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.00409) 
Self-pay 0.00203 0.0388*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00542) (0.00654) (0.00251) 
    
Age in years  -0.00154*** -0.00204*** -0.000631*** 
 (0.000130) (0.000150) (0.0000522) 
Female 0.0892*** 0.129*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00502) (0.00166) 
Black 0.0875*** 0.0835*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.00867) (0.00954) (0.00291) 
Hispanic 0.0873*** 0.0844*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00852) (0.00944) (0.00307) 
Number of total visits 0.345*** 0.259*** -0.00262*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00457) (0.000363) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0173*** -0.0789*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00290) (0.000997) 
R-squared 0.593 0.391 0.068 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.86 0.70 0.730 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Payor status also includes Other and No charge groups. These 
are included in the regression but not reported. The baseline group for race is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as 
controls but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are 
reported in parentheses.  
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month but more within a year than privately-insured patients with respect to the total number of 
visits. However, Medicaid and Medicare patients have more monthly and yearly primary care-
natured visits than privately-insured patients. 
Uninsured patients also visit the emergency department more than privately-insured 
patients both in terms of total visits and PCN visits. It is important to note that the yearly effect is 
not a mechanical translation of the monthly effect. For example, the yearly effect of Medicaid on 
the number of PCN visits (0.0704) is smaller than the extrapolated monthly effect (0.27).  
 After documenting the effect of payor status on number of emergency department visits, I 
now proceed to estimate the effect of the Medicaid Expansion policy. The results from the 
difference-in-difference regression are displayed in Table 7. The number of monthly visits 
decreases by 0.013 in the After group. The number of monthly PCN visits also decreases, though 
not significantly. This makes sense as there are fewer visits each year in this data set, displayed in 
the summary statistics tables. While the coefficients in this table appear small, they are appropriate 
in magnitude when compared to the baseline average. None of the results in the After x 
GotMedicaid row are significant, though all positive. This is the row of primary interest—the 
group that was uninsured and got Medicaid coverage through Medicaid Expansion. The results are 
likely insignificant because most patients do not show up in the emergency department every 
month. To get a better idea of what is happening, the difference-in-difference regression is run on 
the yearly aggregated data set with results displayed in Table 8. Medicaid Expansion increases the 
number of yearly visits by 0.231 and the number of yearly primary care-natured visits by 0.171 for 
the treatment group, with the baseline average being 0.86 and 0.70, respectively. The probability 
of a PCN visit increases by 0.001, but the effect is imprecisely estimated. The magnitude of the  
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Table 7. Difference-in-Difference Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
GotMedicaid 0.0101 0.00938 0.00114 
 (0.00942) (0.0117) (0.00547) 
After -0.0127*** -0.000138 0.00466*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00349) (0.00178) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.00833 0.00640 0.000853 
 (0.0102) (0.0141) (0.00732) 
    
Age in years 0.000158*** -0.000357*** -0.000555*** 
 (0.0000583) (0.0000999) (0.0000557) 
Female -0.00572*** 0.0413*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00369) (0.00190) 
Black 0.00568 0.0104* 0.00705** 
 (0.00401) (0.00624) (0.00313) 
Hispanic 0.0127*** 0.0202*** 0.00413 
 (0.00412) (0.00636) (0.00322) 
Number of total visits 0.0487*** 0.0321*** -0.00243*** 
 (0.000992) (0.00142) (0.000452) 
Number of chronic conditions -0.00529*** -0.0783*** -0.0534*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00178) (0.000982) 
R-squared 0.161 0.071 0.066 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.07 0.058 0.724 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for 
race is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as controls but not reported. Patient location, 












Table 8. Difference-in-Difference Regression (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN 
visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN  
GotMedicaid 0.433*** 0.364*** 0.000338 
 (0.0195) (0.0222) (0.00455) 
After 0.0324*** 0.0379*** 0.00541*** 
 (0.00496) (0.00559) (0.00189) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.231*** 0.171*** 0.00139 
 (0.0222) (0.0247) (0.00640) 
    
Age in years -0.00170*** -0.00226*** -0.000672*** 
 (0.000123) (0.000143) (0.0000506) 
Female 0.0905*** 0.130*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.00436) (0.00499) (0.00165) 
Black 0.0849*** 0.0848*** 0.0174*** 
 (0.00861) (0.00949) (0.00291) 
Hispanic 0.0900*** 0.0919*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00846) (0.00939) (0.00306) 
Number of total visits 0.342*** 0.257*** -0.00219*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00455) (0.000363) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0193*** -0.0769*** -0.0509*** 
 (0.00249) (0.00286) (0.000988) 
R-squared 0.597 0.393 0.067 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.86 0.70 0.730 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for race 
is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as controls but not reported. Patient location, ZIP 





















effect on the total number and the number of PCN visits from these two regressions was larger for 
the yearly variables. 
 Table 9 displays the results from the fixed effects model. Within an individual patient, 
gaining Medicaid coverage increases the number of monthly visits by 0.015. The number of 
monthly PCN visits also increases, though not significantly. However, the probability of a visit 
being PCN decreases, again not significantly. Similar to the difference-in-difference model, the 
results are more significant from the aggregated data. Table 10 shows that when an individual 
gains Medicaid coverage, the number of yearly visits increases by 0.55 and the number of yearly 
PCN visits increases by 0.429. Again, the probability of a visit being PCN decreases, but again the 
effect is imprecisely estimated. The magnitude of the effect on number of total visits and PCN 
visits is again larger for the yearly variables. These findings support the results of the difference-
in-difference model, though there is a lower r-squared value. This is likely due to limited month-
to-month variation in the number of visits within the same patient in the short panel.  
 The difference-in-difference with fixed effects model bolsters the findings of the two 
previous models. Table 11 shows that when an individual gains insurance through Medicaid 
Expansion, the number of monthly visits and the number of monthly PCN visits increase and the 
probability of a visit being PCN decreases, though all coefficients are insignificantly estimated. 
The results from the aggregated data in Table 12 show that when an individual gains coverage 
through Medicaid Expansion, the number of yearly visits increases by 0.314 and the number of 
yearly primary care-natured visits increases by 0.253. Again, the yearly effect is larger than the 
monthly effect. The probability of a visit being PCN increases by 0.0004, but once again is 
insignificantly estimated. All of the regressions yielded insignificant results for the probability of  
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Table 9. Patient Fixed Effects Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
GotMedicaid 0.0152* 0.00190 -0.00504 
 (0.00877) (0.0102) (0.00463) 
    
Number of chronic conditions -0.00391** -0.0611*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00201) (0.000916) 
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.020 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.07 0.058 0.724 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 





Table 10. Patient Fixed Effects Regression (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN 
visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
GotMedicaid 0.550*** 0.429*** -0.00632 
 (0.0208) (0.0200) (0.00500) 
    
Number of chronic conditions -0.0264*** -0.0843*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00540) (0.00135) 
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.016 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.86 0.70 0.730 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 

















Table 11. Difference-in-Difference with Fixed Effects Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
GotMedicaid 0.0163 -0.00443 -0.00728 
 (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.00583) 
After -0.00802** -0.00305 0.00128 
 (0.00354) (0.00411) (0.00187) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.00879 0.0107 -0.000547 
 (0.0143) (0.0165) (0.00752) 
    
Number of chronic conditions -0.00360** -0.0610*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00202) (0.000919) 
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.020 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.07 0.058 0.724 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 
and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are reported in parentheses.  
  
 
Table 12. Difference-in-Difference with Fixed Effects Regression (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN 
visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
GotMedicaid 0.696*** 0.536*** -0.0110* 
 (0.0267) (0.0256) (0.00643) 
After -0.0494*** -0.0417*** -0.0000659 
 (0.00900) (0.00865) (0.00217) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.314*** 0.253*** 0.000477 
 (0.0317) (0.0305) (0.00765) 
    
Number of chronic conditions -0.0219*** -0.0807*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.00564) (0.00542) (0.00136) 
R-squared 0.020 0.019 0.016 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.86 0.70 0.730 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 
and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are reported in parentheses.  
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a visit being primary care-natured. This is likely because the probability of a visit being PCN is 
retrospectively assigned to each observation and therefore is a noisy measure.  
I run two previous regressions (difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference with 
fixed effects) on three more dependent variables to further support the results. I use the number of 
monthly/yearly emergent visits, the number of monthly/yearly primary care-natured visits during 
regular business hours, and the number of monthly/yearly primary care-natured visits outside of 
regular business hours. The results are found in Appendix C.  
 Both regressions indicate that Medicaid Expansion increases the number of emergent visits 
for the treatment group. For the regressions on the yearly aggregated data, the increase in number 
of emergent visits is smaller than the increase in the number of primary care-natured visits (within 
each respective regression). Neither regression on the monthly panel data yields statistically 
significant results for the number of emergent visits.  
 These regressions also indicate that Medicaid Expansion increases the number of primary 
care-natured visits that occur during regular business hours (Monday through Friday, 8:00 am to 
5:00 pm). The number of primary care-natured visits that occur outside of regular business hours 
increases as well as a result of Medicaid Expansion. Within each regression, the increase in PCN 
visits outside of business hours is slightly greater than increase in PCN visits during business 
hours.   
It is important to note that the data set used includes only emergency department visits, not 
all patients records, so I cannot definitively say that Medicaid patients are not also increasing the 
number of visits at appropriate sources of primary care, such as a primary care provider. Also, the 
urgency/nature of the visit was retrospectively classified as opposed to being determined at the 
time of the visit. This likely lead to noise in the construction of the variable.  In addition, patient 
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income information was estimated by their ZIP code median income. With more specific income 
information, the treatment and control groups could be more comparable. 
To confirm that the results are not driven by sample selection, I run a placebo regression 
with the same treatment group but as if the policy implementation occurred in the previous year. 
The placebo policy should not yield that same significant results as the real policy. To do this, I 
change the difference-in-difference model so that Afterit equals one if the year is 2013 (rather than 
2014). The second difference is ExpansionGroupi which equals one if that patient gained Medicaid 
as a result of Medicaid Expansion (the same treatment group as before). The interaction term now 
represents the placebo effect of Medicaid Expansion happening in a different year. This model is 
run on both the monthly and yearly panel data.  
The results of the monthly data are displayed in Table 13. The interaction term is significant 
and negative for both the number of monthly visits as well as the number of monthly primary care-
natured visits. This is different from the results in Table 7, which were imprecisely estimated 
positive effects. The results of the regression on the yearly data are displayed in Table 14. The 
coefficient on the interaction term for the number of yearly visits and the number of PCN yearly 
visits, though significant and positive, are only about 50-65% of the magnitude of the results in 





Table 13. Difference-in-Difference Regression (Placebo Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
ExpansionGroup -0.00571 -0.0157 -0.00910 
 (0.00995) (0.0155) (0.00735) 
After (2013) -0.0119*** -0.00422 0.00293* 
 (0.00245) (0.00339) (0.00171) 
After x ExpansionGroup -0.0227* -0.0398* -0.0116 
 (0.0126) (0.0215) (0.0102) 
    
Age in years 0.000171*** -0.000278*** -0.000566*** 
 (0.0000650) (0.000106) (0.0000582) 
Female -0.00777*** 0.0372*** 0.0255*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00376) (0.00195) 
Black 0.00517 0.0131** 0.00817** 
 (0.00439) (0.00655) (0.00330) 
Hispanic 0.0134*** 0.0210*** 0.00422 
 (0.00448) (0.00670) (0.00341) 
Number of total visits 0.0497*** 0.0337*** -0.00205*** 
 (0.00113) (0.00142) (0.000458) 
Number of chronic conditions -0.00616*** -0.0855*** -0.0578*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00211) (0.00115) 
R-squared 0.160 0.075 0.069 
Observations 140613 140613 140613 
Baseline Average 0.056 0.045 0.726 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for 
race is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as controls but not reported. Patient location, 























Table 14. Difference-in-Difference Regression (Yearly Aggregate) (Placebo Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN 
visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN  
ExpansionGroup 0.0706*** 0.0535** -0.00121 
 (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.00683) 
After (2013) 0.0587*** 0.0570*** 0.00342* 
 (0.00485) (0.00546) (0.00180) 
After x ExpansionGroup 0.152*** 0.0852** -0.000294 
 (0.0307) (0.0364) (0.00859) 
    
Age in years -0.00184*** -0.00231*** -0.000692*** 
 (0.000125) (0.000148) (0.0000542) 
Female 0.0869*** 0.124*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.00443) (0.00510) (0.00177) 
Black 0.0838*** 0.0880*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00870) (0.00977) (0.00320) 
Hispanic 0.0861*** 0.0893*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00861) (0.00972) (0.00336) 
Number of total visits 0.349*** 0.265*** -0.00210*** 
 (0.00515) (0.00483) (0.000392) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0192*** -0.0828*** -0.0548*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00314) (0.00116) 
R-squared 0.598 0.397 0.071 
Observations 96165 96165 96165 
Baseline Average 0.68 0.55 0.731 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for race 
is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as controls but not reported. Patient location, ZIP 







7. Discussion  
7.1 Mechanisms 
The results from multiple models suggest that patients who receive insurance through 
Medicaid Expansion increasingly utilize the emergency department. The empirical models used 
are constructed to identify not only association but causality. The primary models, difference-in-
difference and difference-in-difference with fixed effects, offer slightly different interpretations. 
The original difference-in-difference model explains how emergency department utilization within 
the population changes due to Medicaid Expansion while the difference-in-difference with patient 
fixed effects explains how utilization varies within a patient as a result of Medicaid Expansion. 
Both models support the finding that Medicaid Expansion leads newly-insured patients to increase 
emergency department utilization. Medicaid Expansion causes an increase in the number of total 
visits as well as the number of primary care-natured visits within this population.  
There may be a few reasons for these results. After the policy implementation, some of the 
previously uninsured group now has health insurance, meaning there is a reduced financial burden 
to receiving health care. Reduced cost and improved insurance status may lead these patients to 
increase the overall amount of health care they receive from various sources of care (including 
primary care providers, specialty care providers, etc.), and that result is seen within emergency 
department visits.  
The increase in emergent visits supports the idea that the increased utilization is due to 
reduced cost, as this is more likely than an increase in true health emergencies. When patients were 
uninsured, it is likely that they were going untreated and underutilizing the emergency department 
for health emergencies because of cost. Once covered, patients begin utilizing the emergency 
department appropriately for emergent visits. 
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Still, these now-Medicaid patients, though covered by insurance, may have difficulty 
making appointments with primary care providers (PCPs) leading to the increase in number of 
primary care-natured visits in the emergency department. This idea (lack of access to PCPs) is 
supported by the increase in number of primary care-natured visits during regular business hours. 
For patients visiting the emergency department while primary care providers offices are also open, 
it is assumed that the limited hours of a PCP office is not the restrictive factor. Rather, it is likely 
due to providers’ unwillingness to accept patients because of Medicaid status or the long wait 
times for appointments that patients decide to seek primary care elsewhere (such as the emergency 
department). 
The number of primary care-natured visits outside of regular business hours also increase 
which could mean that individuals are not able to visit the doctor during the day. This is likely 
within the Medicaid population, which is made up of the lower income population who may work 
jobs with few benefits (such as paid time off) or who are unable to skip a paycheck. It also could 
be that patients are still unable to get an appointment with a primary care provider, so they decide 
to receive care at a time convenient to them.  
7.2 Policy Implications 
The Medicaid Expansion policy was designed for many reasons, not necessarily increasing 
access to primary care, and has been successful in many aspects. Previous research has indicated 
that Medicaid Expansion was successful in increasing the number of covered lives and increasing 
access to certain types of care. However, the policy has not necessarily been successful in 
providing all individuals equal access to primary care. 
Specifically, these findings indicate that the policy has not been successful in improving 
access to appropriate sources of primary care for the previously uninsured population. For reasons 
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explained throughout the paper, Medicaid patients consistently have difficulty seeing a primary 
care provider and inefficiently utilize the emergency department for primary care as a result. In a 
healthcare system where insurance coverage is necessary for affordable healthcare and access to 
care, gaining Medicaid does provide benefits to the individual such as lowering the out-of-pocket 
cost of care and improving access to certain providers who do not accept uninsured patients. 
However, because providers consider financial incentives, a Medicaid patient’s access to primary 
care does not appear to very different from an uninsured patient’s access. 
It could be argued that gaining Medicaid does improve access to primary care, by lowering 
the cost of the emergency department, and the patient is better off as a result. However, this is 
extremely inefficient for the healthcare system and still a more expensive alternative for the patient 
than seeing a primary care provider. These results suggest that a different type of policy is needed 
in improve access to primary care providers for all patients. Future healthcare policies should take 
this into account as improving access would benefit both the patients as well as the healthcare 
system.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Medicaid patients have long been known to overutilize the emergency departments and 
have difficulty accessing primary care providers. In terms of access to primary care, it seems as 
though Medicaid coverage may not be much better than no coverage at all. Using a difference-in-
difference strategy, I identify the effect of the Medicaid Expansion policy on primary care-natured 
visits in emergency departments. In particular, I find that Medicaid Expansion increases the 
number of primary care-natured visits and overall emergency department utilization for patients 
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who gained insurance under the policy. These results suggest that issues with access to primary 
care for Medicaid patients persist and continue to lead to inefficient delivery of primary care.  
These findings support previous literature, highlighting the fact that Medicaid coverage 
does not provide adequate access to appropriate sources of primary care. Future policy is required 
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Table A1. Eleven-Country Summary Scores on Health System Performance 
   AUS CAN FRA GER NET NZ NOR SWE SWI UK US 
Overall Ranking 2 9 10 8 3 4 4 6 6 1 11 
Quality Care 2 6 9 8 4 3 10 11 7 1 5 
 Preventative Care 6 1 10 11 3 5 9 8 7 2 4 
 Safe Care 2 7 8 6 5 3 11 10 9 1 3 
 Coordinated Care 7 10 9 3 5 1 7 11 2 4    6 
 Engagement and Patient 
Preferences 
1 6 9 7 2 5 10 11 7 3 4 
Access 4 10 9 2 1 7 5 6 8 3 11 
 Cost-Related Problem 7 8 10 3 5 6 4 9 2 1 11 
 Timeliness of Care 4 11 2 1 3 6 7 10 4 8 9 
Administrative Efficiency 1 6 11 6 9 2 4 5 8 3 10 
Equity 7 9 10 6 2 8 5 3 4 1 11 
Health Outcomes 1 9 5 8 6 7 3 2 4 10 11 
 Population Health            
  Infant Mortality, deaths per 1,000 live births 4 10 5 3 6 9 2 1 7 7 11 
  Adults with at least two common chronic conditions 4 10 8 1 2 2 8 4 4 4 11 
  Life expectancy at age 60 2 4 1 10 7 5 7 6 2 9 11 
 Mortality Amenable to Health Care            
  Mortality Amenable to Health Care, deaths per 100,000 3 7 2 8 6 10 4 5 1 9 11 
  10-year decline in mortality amenable to health care 5 9 7 7 2 3 3 9 5 1 11 
 Disease-Specific Health Outcomes            
  30 day in-hospital mortality rate following acute myocardial infarction 1 5 7 11 9 4 5 2 10 9 3 
  30 day in-hospital mortality rate following ischemic stroke 10 11 7 3 6 8 2 3 5 9 1 
  Breast cancer five-year survival rate 4 4 - 6 8 6 1 1 - 9 1 
  Colon cancer five-year survival rate 1 3 - 3 3 8 3 2 - 9 3 
Source: Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects Flaws and Opportunities for Better U.S. Health Care  








Table B1. Federal Poverty Level 
Persons in 
Household 2013 138% of FPL 2014 138% of FPL 
1 $11,490 $15,856 $11,670 $16,105 
2 $15,510 $21,403 $15,730 $21,707 
3 $19,530 $26,951 $19,790 $27,310 
4 $23,550 $32,499 $23,850 $32,913 
5 $27,570 $38,046 $27,910 $38,516 
6 $31,590 $43,594 $31,970 $44,119 
7 $35,610 $49,141 $36,030 $49,721 
8 $39,630 $54,689 $40,090 $55,324 
Source: Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines 
 
Table B2. Quartile Classification of Median Household Income of Patient’s ZIP Code 
Year Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
2013 $1-$37,999 $38,000-$47,999 $48,000-$63,999 $64,000+ 
2014 $1-$39,999 $40,000-$50,999 $51,000-$65,999 $66,000+ 




Table B3. Patient Characteristics by Year (Full 5% Random Sample) 
 2012  2013  2014  
 N % N % N % 
Total Patients 172,563  56,717  49,444  
Sex       
Female 109,891 53.92 38,117 57.54 32,992 57.07 
Male 93,897 46.08 28,122 42.46 24,815 42.93 
Age group (Years)       
Under 20 53,289 26.15 15,938 24.06 12,371 21.40 
20 to 39 65,341 32.06 22,917 34.60 19,586 33.88 
40 to 65 61,071 29.97 19,675 29.70 18,698 32.35 
Over 65 24,087 11.82 7,709 11.64 7,152 12.37 
Race/Ethnicity       
White 91,298 44.80 26,814 40.48 24,507 42.39 
Black 44,473 21.82 17,472 26.38 15,535 26.87 
Hispanic 38,176 18.73 14,082 21.26 11,082 19.17 
Other 29,841 14.64 7,871 11.88 6,683 11.56 
Primary Payor       
Medicaid 59,783 29.34 26,200 39.55 23,067 39.90 
Private insurance 74,270 36.44 18,117 27.35 15,441 26.71 
Self-pay 32,260 15.83 8,626 13.02 6,861 11.87 
Medicare 27,580 13.53 10,419 15.73 9,898 17.12 
Other 9,397 4.61 2,768 4.18 2,480 4.29 
No charge 498 0.24 109 0.16 60 0.10 
Median Household Income National Quartile for Patient ZIP Code    
First Quartile 62,031 30.78 20,397 31.05 18,637 32.50 
Second Quartile 45,997 22.82 16,920 25.76 14,536 25.35 
Third Quartile 40,665 20.18 13,674 20.82 11,362 19.82 
Fourth Quartile 52,844 26.22 14,693 22.37 12,804 22.33 
Patient Location       
Large Metropolitan 151,565 74.60 48,116 72.71 43,725 75.69 
Small Metropolitan 31,856 15.68 10,813 16.34 8,131 14.08 
Micropolitan 14,398 7.09 5,319 8.04 4,269 7.39 
Other 5,356 2.64 1,926 2.91 1,643 2.84 
Chronic Conditions       
None 132,892 65.21 39,060 58.97 31,946 55.26 
One or more 70,896 34.79 27,179 41.03 25,861 44.74 
Revisit       
Yes 58,441 28.68 29,489 44.52 24,830 42.95 
No 145,347 71.32 36,750 55.48 32,977 57.05 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Other Race/Ethnicity includes Asian or Pacific Islander, Native American, and Other. Other primary payor includes 
Worker’s Compensation, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Title V, and other government programs. In 2012, the first quartile income 
range was $1-38,999, second quartile was $39,000-47,999. In 2013, the first quartile income range was $1-37,999, second 
quartile was $38,000-47,999. In 2014, the first quartile income range was $1-39,999, second quartile was $40,000-50,999. 
Large metropolitan areas include more than 1 million residents. Small metropolitan areas include less than 1 million residents. 
Micropolitan areas include urban clusters of 10,000 – 50,000 residents. Other is defined as not metropolitan or micropolitan. 
 51 
Table B4.  Admission Characteristics by Year (Full 5% Random Sample) 
 2012  2013  2014  
 N % N % N % 
Total Visits 318,598  136,309  116,827  
Admission Day of the Week       
Weekday 230,814 72.45 100,019 73.38 85,694 73.35 
Weekend 87,784 27.55 36,290 26.62 31,133 26.65 
Admission Hour       
Business Hours (8 to 5) 132,567 41.61 57,083 41.88 48,860 41.82 
After Business Hours 186,031 58.39 79,226 58.12 67,967 58.18 
Disposition Status       
Routine 302,205 94.92 129,545 95.10 111,248 95.28 
Short-Term Hospital 4,176 1.31 1,425 1.05 1,073 0.92 
Transfer Other 2,716 0.85 1,534 1.13 1,637 1.40 
Home Health Care 2,955 0.93 720 0.53 165 0.14 
Against Medical Advice 5,810 1.8 2,829 2.08 2,519 2.16 
Died in Hospital 517 0.16 159 0.12 111 0.10 
Length of Stay (Days)       
0 290,749 91.29 121,478 89.18 102,865 88.12 
1 26,514 8.33 13,848 10.17 12,995 11.13 
2 957 0.30 710 0.52 700 0.60 
3 252 0.08 175 0.13 170 0.15 
Nature of Visit       
Emergent 156,108 49.00 63,286 46.43 54,603 46.74 
Primary Care-Natured 162,490 51.00 73,023 53.57 62,224 53.26 
 Avg SD Avg SD Avg SD 
Hospital ED Charges $1,865.92 $2,447.96 $1,993.32 $2,906.36 $2,210.96 $2,766.38 
Number of Diagnosis 
Codes 2.30 1.84 2.60 2.17 2.60 2.17 
Number of CPT Codes 5.84 6.13 5.72 5.97 6.46 6.94 
Probability of Primary 
Care Visit 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.41 0.47 0.41 
Source: Author’s calculations from HCUP SEDD. 
Notes: Transfer Other means transfer to Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF), Intermediate Care Facility (ICF), or Other. A 0-day 
length of stays means a same-day stay. The variable is limited to 0-3 days for outpatient data. Hospital ED Charges is measured 
















 Tables C1 and C2 display the results from the OLS regression examining the effect of payor status 
on emergency department utilization, with uninsured as the reference payor group. Since the population 
that makes up the uninsured group changes, it is not a consistent reference point over time. However, these 
regressions do provide interesting, supplemental results. Medicaid and Medicare patients visit the 
emergency department less on a monthly basis and more on a yearly basis when compared to uninsured 
patients. 
Table C1. OLS Regression by Payor Status: Uninsured Reference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
Medicaid -0.00972*** -0.0156*** 0.000901 
 (0.00330) (0.00460) (0.00237) 
Medicare -0.0151** -0.00386 0.00962** 
 (0.00653) (0.00950) (0.00437) 
Private -0.00438 -0.0381*** -0.0208*** 
 (0.00319) (0.00487) (0.00264) 
    
Age in years 0.000137** -0.000373*** -0.000533*** 
 (0.0000617) (0.000104) (0.0000576) 
Female -0.00548** 0.0422*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00369) (0.00190) 
Black 0.00581 0.00837 0.00543* 
 (0.00402) (0.00624) (0.00313) 
Hispanic 0.0133*** 0.0174*** 0.00145 
 (0.00413) (0.00638) (0.00322) 
Number of total visits 0.0488*** 0.0319*** -0.00275*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00144) (0.000456) 
Number of chronic conditions -0.00517*** -0.0786*** -0.0539*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00180) (0.000996) 
R-squared 0.161 0.071 0.067 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.07 0.058 0.724 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01   
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Payor status also includes 
Other and No charge groups. These are included in the regression but not reported. The baseline group for race is White. 
Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included as controls but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, and 




Table C2. OLS Regression by Payor Status: Uninsured Reference (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly visits Number of yearly PCN 
visits 
Probability of visit 
being PCN 
Medicaid 0.0403*** 0.0316*** 0.00230 
 (0.00547) (0.00626) (0.00219) 
Medicare 0.0390*** 0.0269* 0.00735* 
 (0.0136) (0.0146) (0.00423) 
Private -0.00203 -0.0388*** -0.0188*** 
 (0.00542) (0.00654) (0.00251) 
    
Age in years  -0.00154*** -0.00204*** -0.000631*** 
 (0.000130) (0.000150) (0.0000522) 
Female 0.0892*** 0.129*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00502) (0.00166) 
Black 0.0875*** 0.0835*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.00867) (0.00954) (0.00291) 
Hispanic 0.0873*** 0.0844*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00852) (0.00944) (0.00307) 
Number of total visits 0.345*** 0.259*** -0.00262*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00457) (0.000363) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0173*** -0.0789*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00290) (0.000997) 
R-squared 0.593 0.391 0.068 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.86 0.70 0.730 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Payor status also includes 
Other and No charge groups. These are included in the regression but not reported. The baseline group for race is White. 
Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, and the 




Table C3. Difference-in-Difference Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
emergent visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits in business 
hours 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits out of 
business hours 
GotMedicaid 0.00346 0.0253** -0.0274** 
 (0.00940) (0.0113) (0.0118) 
After -0.0122*** -0.00404 0.00380 
 (0.00302) (0.00339) (0.00365) 
After x GotMedicaid -0.000883 0.00265 -0.000290 
 (0.0115) (0.0136) (0.0145) 
    
Age in years 0.000511*** 0.00207*** -0.00243*** 
 (0.0000909) (0.0000888) (0.0000972) 
Female -0.0471*** 0.0293*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00309) (0.00344) 
Black -0.00467 0.0269*** -0.0167*** 
 (0.00565) (0.00544) (0.00597) 
Hispanic -0.00784 0.0413*** -0.0216*** 
 (0.00546) (0.00560) (0.00624) 
Number of total visits 0.0166*** 0.00949*** 0.0226*** 
 (0.00137) (0.000802) (0.00106) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0730*** -0.0387*** -0.0395*** 
 (0.00166) (0.00140) (0.00160) 
R-squared 0.070 0.028 0.046 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.014 0.025 0.033 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for 
race is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, 








Table C4. Difference-in-Difference Regression (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly 
emergent visits 
Number of yearly PCN 
visits in business hours 
Number of yearly PCN 
visits out of business 
hours 
GotMedicaid 0.0721*** 0.180*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0198) 
After -0.00527 0.0159*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00509) (0.00540) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.0520*** 0.0791*** 0.0900*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0207) (0.0220) 
    
Age in years 0.000490*** 0.00199*** -0.00424*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000123) (0.000132) 
Female -0.0390*** 0.0702*** 0.0589*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00422) (0.00449) 
Black 0.00174 0.0645*** 0.0205** 
 (0.00704) (0.00773) (0.00844) 
Hispanic 0.00150 0.0816*** 0.0108 
 (0.00715) (0.00781) (0.00852) 
Number of total visits 0.0861*** 0.103*** 0.154*** 
 (0.00314) (0.00252) (0.00293) 
Number of chronic conditions 0.0976*** -0.0392*** -0.0391*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00221) (0.00243) 
R-squared 0.144 0.132 0.214 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.17 0.30 0.39 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. The baseline group for race 
is White. Asian/Pacific Island, Native American, and Other race are included but not reported. Patient location, ZIP code, and 




Table C5. Difference-in-Difference with Fixed Effects Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of monthly 
emergent visits 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits in business 
hours 
Number of monthly 
PCN visits out of 
business hours 
GotMedicaid 0.0207** 0.0110 -0.0154 
 (0.00984) (0.0122) (0.0132) 
After -0.00496 -0.00364 0.000583 
 (0.00315) (0.00390) (0.00423) 
After x GotMedicaid -0.00194 0.00346 0.00727 
 (0.0127) (0.0157) (0.0171) 
    
Number of chronic conditions 0.0574*** -0.0335*** -0.0276*** 
 (0.00155) (0.00192) (0.00208) 
R-squared 0.014 0.003 0.002 
Observations 178726 178726 178726 
Baseline Average 0.014 0.025 0.033 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-month combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 
and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table C6. Difference-in-Difference with Fixed Effects Regression (Yearly Aggregate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Number of yearly 
emergent visits 
Number of yearly PCN 
visits in business hours 
Number of yearly PCN 
visits out of business 
hours 
GotMedicaid 0.160*** 0.217*** 0.319*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0200) (0.0222) 
After -0.00762 -0.0195*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00676) (0.00751) 
After x GotMedicaid 0.0616*** 0.111*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0238) (0.0265) 
    
Number of chronic conditions 0.0587*** -0.0443*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00424) (0.00471) 
R-squared 0.010 0.006 0.008 
Observations 119793 119793 119793 
Baseline Average 0.17 0.30 0.39 
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
Notes: An observation is a unique patient-year combination. PCN stands for primary care-natured. Patient location, ZIP code, 
and the constant term are included but not reported. The standard errors clustered at patient level are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
